Incentive-compatibility in large games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00023-1MaRDI QIDQ1296488zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Klaus Nehring

Publication date 23 September 1999

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00023-1

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrialarge gamesBayesian Nash equilibriacountably infinite number of players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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• Strategy-proofness in the large
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• On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

Cites work

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• An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
• Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables
• Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
• Fair allocations in large economies
• Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• The core-Walras equivalence
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables

Cited in

(5)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5679979 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
• Strategy-proofness in the large
• Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better
• Partial exposure in large games

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