Bankruptcy and optimality in a closed trading mass economy modelled as a non-cooperative game
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(79)90001-6zbMATH Open0416.90008OpenAlexW2024066708MaRDI QIDQ754746FDOQ754746
Authors: Pradeep Dubey, Martin Shubik
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(79)90001-6
game theoretic modelcompetitive equilibrium pointsnoncooperative equilibrium pointsoptimal bankruptcy ruletrade in fiat moneyWalrasian trading economy
Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Cites Work
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- The optimal bankruptcy rule in a trading economy using fiat money
- A closed economy with exogenous uncertainty, different levels of information, money, futures and spot markets
Cited In (8)
- Noncooperative exchange using money and broker-dealers
- A strategic market game with transactions costs
- Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
- A strategic market game with secured lending
- A strategic market game of a finite exchange economy with a mutual bank
- Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
- A note on an optimal garnishing rule
- The unique minimal cash flow competitive equilibrium
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