Bankruptcy and optimality in a closed trading mass economy modelled as a non-cooperative game

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(79)90001-6zbMath0416.90008MaRDI QIDQ754746

Martin Shubik, Pradeep Dubey

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(79)90001-6

zbMATH Keywords

game theoretic model; competitive equilibrium points; noncooperative equilibrium points; optimal bankruptcy rule; trade in fiat money; Walrasian trading economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

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Cites Work

• A closed economy with exogenous uncertainty, different levels of information, money, futures and spot markets
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• The optimal bankruptcy rule in a trading economy using fiat money
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Unnamed Item