Dynamic marriage matching: an empirical framework
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Publication:4614293
DOI10.3982/ECTA10675zbMATH Open1419.91522OpenAlexW1901369263MaRDI QIDQ4614293FDOQ4614293
Authors: Eugene S. Y. Choo 
Publication date: 30 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10675
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- Late marriage and transition from arranged marriages to love matches: a search-theoretic approach
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- ``Why not settle down already? A quantitative analysis of the delay in marriage
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- Optimal weights for marital sorting measures
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- DIVORCE AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MARITAL SEARCH
- Matching in marriage and markets
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