A simple solution to the problem of \textit{independence of irrelevant alternatives} in Choo and Siow marriage market model

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108785zbMATH Open1429.91233OpenAlexW2970048805MaRDI QIDQ2292773FDOQ2292773

Authors: Federico H. Gutierrez 

Publication date: 5 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108785

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zbMATH Keywords

transferable utilityindependence of irrelevant alternativesmarriage markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems
• Dynamic marriage matching: an empirical framework
• A marriage matching function with flexible spillover and substitution patterns

Cited In (2)

• Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market
• A note on the independence of irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

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