Preference aggregation with incomplete information
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(18)- Utilitarianism with and without expected utility
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- Fully Bayesian aggregation
- Preferences and information processing under vague information
- Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism
- Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
- Social preference under twofold uncertainty
- Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements
- Social rationality, separability, and equity under uncertainty
- Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: unanimity vs monotonicity
- Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences
- Evaluacion multiatributo con informacion parcial sobre las preferencias
- Inferring Sparse Preference Lists from Partial Information
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
- Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities
- Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice
- Aggregation of misspecified experts
- The veil of public ignorance
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