Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: unanimity vs monotonicity

DOI10.1007/S00355-018-1158-9MaRDI QIDQ2417410zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Federica Ceron, Vassili Vergopoulos

Publication date 12 June 2019

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01539444/file/17028.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto dominanceaggregation of Bayesian preferencesstatewise dominancesubjective expected utility functional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
• Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts
• Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties
• Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• A note on affine aggregation
• Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements
• No-betting-Pareto dominance
• Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
• Preference aggregation with incomplete information
• Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects
• Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
• Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: an axiomatic approach
• Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors

Cited in

(5)

• Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities
• Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences
• Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis

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