The relationship between two algorithms for decisions via sophisticated majority voting with an agenda

DOI10.1016/0166-218X(91)90029-VzbMATH Open0727.90006MaRDI QIDQ804450FDOQ804450

Authors: K. B. Reid 

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

majority tournamentamendment proceduresophisticated voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-08)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Choosing from a tournament
• Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure

Cited In (2)

• An efficient algorithm for voting sequences
• Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure

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