Algorithms for Social Choice Functions

DOI10.2307/2297312zbMATH Open0437.90014OpenAlexW1992288632MaRDI QIDQ3879002FDOQ3879002

Authors: Donald E. Campbell 

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297312

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsincentive compatibilitysimple majority rulesocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Numerical mathematical programming methods (65K05) Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (5)

• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting
• A characterization of simple majority rule for restricted domains
• On the derivation of majority rule
• On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences

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