The structure of social decision functions
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Publication:761329
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4zbMath0555.90004OpenAlexW2052937845WikidataQ57927176 ScholiaQ57927176MaRDI QIDQ761329
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4
Pareto principleacyclicitytransitivitydirected graphssocial preferencesArrow Impossibility Theoremcollective rationality conditionweaker assumptions
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