The structure of social decision functions
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Publication:761329
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4zbMATH Open0555.90004OpenAlexW2052937845WikidataQ57927176 ScholiaQ57927176MaRDI QIDQ761329FDOQ761329
Authors: D. Kelsey 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4
Recommendations
transitivitydirected graphsPareto principleacyclicitysocial preferencesArrow Impossibility Theoremcollective rationality conditionweaker assumptions
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
- Acyclic choice and group veto
- Social Decision Functions and the Veto
Cited In (15)
- Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
- Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
- Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
- Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
- Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The liberal paradox: A generalisation
- Universal characterization of non-transitive preferences
- Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
- Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Acyclic choice and group veto
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