Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
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Publication:2388789
DOI10.1007/s003550000063zbMath1069.91565OpenAlexW1964625459MaRDI QIDQ2388789
Josep E. Peris, M. Carmen Sánchez
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000063
Related Items (3)
Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice ⋮ A foundation for Pareto optimality ⋮ Collective choice rules with social maximality
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