Pareto principles from Inch to Ell

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00339-6zbMath0963.91020OpenAlexW2099222495WikidataQ127725715 ScholiaQ127725715MaRDI QIDQ1589619

Kotaro Suzumura

Publication date: 12 December 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00339-6

zbMATH Keywords

divisible and indivisible goodsPareto principlespossibility of compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02)

Related Items (10)

Conundrums for nonconsequentialists ⋮ Collective choice rules with social maximality ⋮ Laissez-faire versus Pareto ⋮ When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto? ⋮ On the impossibility of complete non-interference in Paretian social judgements ⋮ The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated ⋮ Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions ⋮ Is the preference of the majority representative? ⋮ Kaplow-Shavell welfarism without continuity ⋮ Weak and strong optimality and increasing concave functions

Cites Work

• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods

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