Collective Choice May Tell Nothing About Anyone’s Individual Preferences

DOI10.1287/deca.2020.0417OpenAlexW3113049913MaRDI QIDQ4991776

Muye Chen, Clintin P. Davis-Stober, Michel Regenwetter

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2020.0417

zbMATH Keywords

decision makingpooled dataprobabilistic specificationaggregation paradoxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Uses Software

• QTest

Cites Work

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