A power rule for social choice
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Publication:802457
DOI10.1007/BF00452881zbMATH Open0558.90009MaRDI QIDQ802457FDOQ802457
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Social choice and individual values
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- Some Properties of Topological Social Choice Functions
- On transitivity of the social preference relation under simple majority rule
- The Continuous Representation of a Social Preference Ordering
- Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings
Cited In (3)
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