A power rule for social choice
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Publication:802457
DOI10.1007/BF00452881zbMATH Open0558.90009MaRDI QIDQ802457FDOQ802457
Authors: Rubin Saposnik 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
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- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- Some Properties of Topological Social Choice Functions
- On transitivity of the social preference relation under simple majority rule
- The Continuous Representation of a Social Preference Ordering
- Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings
Cited In (8)
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Power in Decisions Among Multiple Alternatives
- Power allocation rules under multicriteria situation
- A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference
- FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND WEIGHTED MONOTONICITY OF POWER
- Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
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