A power rule for social choice (Q802457)

The social choice process is modeled as a sequence of challenges to the status quo. In order to overcome the status quo proponents of change must degenerate sufficient power. \(\ell\) agents with complete and reflexive preference rankings \(R_ i\), \(i=1,...,\ell\), must choose collectively from a set of alternatives X which is a compact convex set in \({\mathcal R}^ n\). Each agent is characterized by a function \(m_ i:X\times X\to {\mathcal R}\) defined in terms of the associated strict preference ranking by \[ m_ i(y,x)\geq 0\quad if\quad yP_ ix,\quad m_ i(y,x)\leq 0\quad if\quad xP_ iy\quad and\quad m_ i(y,x)=0\quad otherwise. \] \(m_ i(y,x)\) is interpreted as the power exerted by agent i in replacing the status quo state x with the state y. The following assumptions are made on \(m_ i:\) (c.1) \(m_ i\) is continuous on \(X\times X\). (c.2) For all x,y and \(z\in X\), \(m_ i[ty+(1-t)z,x]=tm_ i(y,x)+(1-t)m_ i(z,x)\) for all \(0<t<1.\) With x the prevailing state and y an alternative, it is assumed that there exists a real number \(\alpha >0\) such that y defeats x (yDx) if and only if \(\sum^{\ell}_{i=1}m_ i(y,x)\geq \alpha\). x withstands y (xWy) whenever \(\sim [yDx]\). Given these assumptions it is shown using Kakutani's theorem that there exists a state \(\hat x\in X\) such that \(\hat xW\)x for all \(x\in X.\) The stability problem posed by the possibility that D will generate a finite cycle away from equilibrium is also addressed. A sufficient condition is provided to ensure that the power relation D is transitive. This is used to rule out the possibility of the power rule generating a finite cycle.