Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
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Publication:3095299
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24873-3_11zbMATH Open1233.91091OpenAlexW2154896738MaRDI QIDQ3095299FDOQ3095299
Authors: Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24873-3_11
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