Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
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Publication:687048
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90022-DzbMATH Open0786.90003MaRDI QIDQ687048FDOQ687048
Authors: Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa 
Publication date: 2 December 1993
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
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- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Semiorders and collective choice
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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- On Arrow-type impossibility theorems with infinite individuals and infinite alternatives
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Cited In (7)
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate
- Undecidability of the existence of dictator for strongly candidate stable voting procedures in an infinite society and Cantor's diagonal argument
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- Arrovian social choices
- Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
- Acyclic choice and group veto
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