Arrovian social choices
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Publication:2995649
zbMATH Open1210.91034MaRDI QIDQ2995649FDOQ2995649
Authors:
Publication date: 4 May 2011
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- Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
- From Arrow's theorem to incentives and price dynamics
- Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- The arrow impossibility theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and limited principle of omniscience
- Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow
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- Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
- On Quine on Arrow
- Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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