Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules (Q2171850)

This article introduces a condition of equal treatment of congruent distributions (ETCD) for social choice functions. This condition implies an equal treatment condition for individuals which is a weakening of anonymity, and an equal treatment condition for alternatives which is a weakening of neutrality. Two given preference profiles that share the same shape of the distribution of votes except for the names of alternatives and individuals are said to have congruent distributions. ETCD requires that, under two preference profiles having congruent distributions, the chosen alternatives should share the same number of votes. ETCD implies nondictatorship whenever the number of individuals is three or more. A class of social choice functions called the class of tie-breaking plurality (TBP) rules is studied. It is defined by the property of selecting a single alternative among the alternatives having the maximal votes whenever there are two or more such alternatives. The class of TBP rules is characterized by ETCD plus one of two types of positive responsiveness conditions. The first such condition is named monotonicity and is defined by: if an alternative chosen at a given preference profile becomes most preferred whereas the relative rank of other alternatives remains the same under a new preference of an individual, then the alternative should remain chosen at the new preference profile. The second condition characterizes the TBP class if the number of individuals is large enough. It is called weak monotonicity and requires that if an alternative chosen at a given preference profile becomes from second preferred to most preferred, whereas the relative rank of other alternatives remains the same under a new preference of an individual, then the alternative should remain chosen by the new preference profile. The study is developed under assumptions of fixed number of individuals and fixed number of alternatives.