Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange

DOI10.3390/G1010018MaRDI QIDQ2344925zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gary Bornstein, Ori Weisel

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1010018

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationexperimental gamespublic-goods gamepunishmentreciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Review text

Summary: Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish non-cooperators or cheaters. The experimental evidence comes from public goods games in which group members are fully informed about the behavior of all others and cheating occurs in full view. We demonstrate that under more realistic information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating.

Recommendations

• Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
• Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
• Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Cites work

• Informal insurance in social networks
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations

Cited in

(8)

• Cooperation in viscous populations-experimental evidence
• Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment
• Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
• When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

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