Sticks and carrots: two incentive mechanisms supporting intra-group cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.12.012zbMATH Open1176.91037OpenAlexW2003778055MaRDI QIDQ1036862FDOQ1036862

Authors: Thorsten Janus, Jamus Jerome Lim 

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.12.012

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zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaintra-group cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures

Cited In (3)

• Sample path analysis of contribution and reward in cooperative groups
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Sustaining cooperation through strategic self-interested actions

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