Sticks and carrots: two incentive mechanisms supporting intra-group cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.12.012MaRDI QIDQ1036862zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thorsten Janus, Jamus Jerome Lim

Publication date 13 November 2009

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.12.012

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaintra-group cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by incentives
• The shared reward dilemma
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation

Cites work

• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(3)

• Sample path analysis of contribution and reward in cooperative groups
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Sustaining cooperation through strategic self-interested actions

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