A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
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(50)- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
- A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
- On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Non-excludable public good experiments
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy
- Markets for public decision-making
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- On the theory of cost sharing
- Enlarging the collective model of household behavior: a revealed preference analysis
- Divide-and-permute
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Household behavior and individual autonomy: an extended Lindahl mechanism
- A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
- Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
- One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing
- A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
- Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
- Participation and demand levels for a joint project
- Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
- Implementation theory
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
- Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
- Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
- Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
- Local public good equilibrium
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Quadratic funding with incomplete information
- The Walker-Groves-Ledyard mechanism: improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
- Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
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