Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
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(60)- Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
- Walrasian analysis via two-player games
- A market game approach to differential information economies
- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- On the generic inefficiency of differentiable market games
- Random competitive exchange: Price distributions and gains from trade
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- The optimal design of a market
- Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
- Nash equilibria of market games: Finiteness and inefficiency
- A condition guaranteeing that the Nash alloation is Walrasian
- Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- General equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition: A Cournotian approach
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik.
- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
- Walrasian bargaining.
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
- Strategy-proof risk sharing
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
- Market games and Walrasian equilibria
- The evolution of monetary equilibrium
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Constrained implementation
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
- Implementation theory
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
- Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
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