Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty
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Publication:5026444
DOI10.1287/moor.2020.1120zbMath1483.91122OpenAlexW3134260733MaRDI QIDQ5026444
Publication date: 8 February 2022
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1120
Bayesian incentive compatibilityex post individual rationalitycorrelated valuationsmonopoly mechanism
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Cites Work
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