Temporary boycotts as self-fulfilling disruptions of markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.01.005MaRDI QIDQ2397626zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Peck

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

boycottdemand uncertaintymonopolysunspot

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cites work

• Dynamic competition with random demand and costless search: a theory of price posting
• Temporary boycotts as self-fulfilling disruptions of markets

Cited in

(5)

• Firm response to ethically motivated boycotts
• Non-optimality of state by state monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty: an example
• Voting with your pocketbook - a stochastic model of consumer boycotts
• Temporary boycotts as self-fulfilling disruptions of markets
• Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty

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