Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.04.005zbMATH Open1208.91086OpenAlexW2041316801MaRDI QIDQ632972FDOQ632972

Authors: Ran Eilat, Ady Pauzner 

Publication date: 28 March 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275716/files/12-2008.pdf

Recommendations

• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingbilateral trademechanism designprivate valuesbuyer-seller problemmultiple objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Mathematical tools for hazard function analysis.
• A note on linked bargaining

Cited In (3)

• Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
• Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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