The market for lemons and information theory

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.10.002zbMATH Open1505.91105OpenAlexW4306167256MaRDI QIDQ2108772FDOQ2108772

Authors: Robert Mamada 

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.10.002

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zbMATH Keywords

indexmutual informationinformation theoryadverse selectionsequential Bayesian game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities

Cited In (2)

• Endogenous lemons markets and information cycles
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

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