Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0613-XMaRDI QIDQ2490710zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antoine Martin

Publication date 18 May 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x

zbMATH Keywords

Bank panicsDeposit insuranceLiquidity provisionMoral hazard.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(12)

• Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
• On run-preventing contract design
• Central bank digital currency and flight to safety
• The effect of the central bank's standing facilities on interbank lending and bank liquidity holding
• Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking
• The fragility of short-term secured funding markets
• Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: can we sleep well?
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment
• Money under the mattress: inflation and lending of last resort
• Banks, markets, and efficiency
• Bank runs and privately funded solutions

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