Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: can we sleep well?

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0897-4MaRDI QIDQ255170zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf

Publication date 9 March 2016

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0897-4

zbMATH Keywords

bank runscommitmentdeposit insuranceoptimal liquidationredistribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology
• Preventing bank runs

Cites work

• Bailouts and financial fragility
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Sustainable plans and debt

Cited in

(8)

• Introduction to the symposium on bubbles, multiple equilibria, and economic activities
• Enriching information to prevent bank runs
• Redenomination risk and bank runs in a monetary union with and without deposit insurance schemes
• Government guarantees and financial stability
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated *
• Bank runs and privately funded solutions
• Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment

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