The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2006.11.004MaRDI QIDQ996586zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder

Publication date 24 September 2007

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2006.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingexternalityproperty rightsincomplete contractsCoase theorempolluterreciprocal harm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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