The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2006.11.004zbMATH Open1155.91369OpenAlexW3121648095WikidataQ126260507 ScholiaQ126260507MaRDI QIDQ996586FDOQ996586

Authors: Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder 

Publication date: 24 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2006.11.004

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingexternalityproperty rightsincomplete contractsCoase theorempolluterreciprocal harm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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