Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
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Publication:421564
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.024zbMath1237.91118MaRDI QIDQ421564
Carles Rafels, F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Marina Núñez
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.024
Cites Work
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- Characterization of cores of assignment games
- Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
- Assignment games with stable core
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- Inventory games.
- Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Assignment Problems
- Minimum cost spanning tree games
- On the core of linear production games
- Cost allocation in continuous-review inventory models