Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
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- On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference
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- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions
- Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice
- A probabilistic model of social choice
- Power in Decisions Among Multiple Alternatives
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5308192 (Why is no real title available?)
- Social Choice Theory
- Probabilistic analysis of power assignments
- Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- Uncertainty in discount rate and aggregation of time preferences
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament
- On probabilistic rationalizability
- A power rule for social choice
- `Regular' choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference
- Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
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