Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
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Publication:2386286
DOI10.1007/S003550050117zbMATH Open1066.91536OpenAlexW2038850267MaRDI QIDQ2386286FDOQ2386286
Authors: Peter Fristrup, Hans Keiding 
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050117
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Cited In (10)
- Two-person and majority continuous aggregation in 2-good space in social choice: A note
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Interjacency
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
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