Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
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Cited in
(10)- Two-person and majority continuous aggregation in 2-good space in social choice: A note
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Interjacency
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
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