Optimal analysis for bandit learning in matching markets with serial dictatorship
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Publication:6589852
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626726 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bandit algorithms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Player-optimal stable regret for bandit learning in matching markets
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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