Extremal structures and symmetric equilibria with countable actions
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Cites work
- A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
- A Quick Proof for a One-Dimensional Version of Liapounoff's Theorem
- A Remark on Extreme Doubly Stochastic Measures
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3861790 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19677 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19678 (Why is no real title available?)
- On a theorem of Schmeidler
- On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games With a Nonmetrizable Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
- On extremal measures and subspace density
Cited in
(11)- A remark on the measurability of large games
- On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games
- The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces
- Pure strategies in games with private information
- Large games with countable characteristics
- The women of Cairo: equilibria in large anonymous games
- Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19678 (Why is no real title available?)
- On differentiated and indivisible commodities: an expository re-framing of Mas-Colell's 1975 model
- The marriage lemma and large anonymous games with countable actions
- Non-additive anonymous games
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