Extremal structures and symmetric equilibria with countable actions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00688-7zbMath0833.90140OpenAlexW2077443705MaRDI QIDQ1804339

M. Ali Khan, Yeneng Sun

Publication date: 14 May 1995

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00688-7

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot-Nash equilibriumsymmetric equilibriacountable actionsatomless anonymous game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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