On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.04.002zbMATH Open1397.91051OpenAlexW2801036354MaRDI QIDQ1787615FDOQ1787615

Authors: Haifeng Fu, Bin Wu 

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.002

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• Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games
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zbMATH Keywords

characterizationNash equilibrium distribution(symmetric) Nash equilibrium action distributionlarge distributional games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Why saturated probability spaces are necessary
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Pure strategies in games with private information
• On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization
• Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence
• Existence of Nash equilibria in large games
• The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces
• Large distributional games with traits
• Extremal structures and symmetric equilibria with countable actions

Cited In (2)

• On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games With a Nonmetrizable Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
• Large games with countable characteristics

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