Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.12.007MaRDI QIDQ1714079zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Chuyi Fang, Bin Wu

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

large distributionalized gamesNash equilibrium distributionsocially-maximal Nash equilibrium distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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Cites work

• Existence of Nash equilibria in large games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
• Large distributional games with traits
• Large games with a bio-social typology
• Modeling infinitely many agents
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games
• The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces

Cited in

(7)

• On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games
• Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits
• The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
• A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities
• Large distributional games with traits
• Social equilibrium in a generalized Nash game with the affine condition
• On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games

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