A remark on the measurability of large games

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0350-ZzbMath1159.91317OpenAlexW2157024987MaRDI QIDQ1014326

Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 27 April 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/803988/1/mble071025.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (2)

Large extensive form games ⋮ Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities

Cites Work

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• On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games With a Nonmetrizable Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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