Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.02.022MaRDI QIDQ1934150zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kasper Leufkens, Ronald Peeters

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/882199/guid-80c00258-6844-40b3-a124-914c0665c084-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbankruptcyprocurementsynergies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies
• Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
• Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
• Optimal two-object auctions with synergies
• Sequential Auctions with Multiple Synergies

Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.

Cited in

(2)

• Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation
• An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies

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