Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082123 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
- Coalition-proof equilibrium
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
- Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Social choice with procedural preferences
- Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Cited in
(9)- How many freemasons are there? The consensus voting mechanism in metric spaces
- (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
- Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus
- Provision of public goods via unilateral but mutually conditional commitments -- mechanism, equilibria, and learning
- Balanced voting
- Consensus time in a voter model with concealed and publicly expressed opinions
- Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts
- Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
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