Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0517-YzbMATH Open1278.91047OpenAlexW2044656211WikidataQ56144025 ScholiaQ56144025MaRDI QIDQ656798FDOQ656798

Forest W. Simmons, Jobst Heitzig

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0517-y

zbMATH Keywords

benchmarkvoting methodlotteryconsensus decision-makingfall-back methodrandom ballotstrong correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
• Social choice with procedural preferences
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

Cited In (4)

• How many freemasons are there? The consensus voting mechanism in metric spaces
• (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
• Consensus time in a voter model with concealed and publicly expressed opinions
• Convergence results for unanimous voting

This page was built for publication: Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q656798)