Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0517-YMaRDI QIDQ656798zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jobst Heitzig, Forest W. Simmons

Publication date 13 January 2012

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0517-y

zbMATH Keywords

benchmarkvoting methodlotteryconsensus decision-makingfall-back methodrandom ballotstrong correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082123 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Social choice with procedural preferences
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies

Cited in

(7)

• (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
• Balanced voting
• Consensus time in a voter model with concealed and publicly expressed opinions
• How many freemasons are there? The consensus voting mechanism in metric spaces
• Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts
• Convergence results for unanimous voting
• Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms

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