Perfect equilibria in stochastic games
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We examine stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. For the \(\beta\)-discounted case, as well as for the irreducible limiting average case, we show the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria and give characterizations of those equilibria. In the final section, we give an example which illustrates that the existence of stationary limiting average equilibria in a nonirreducible stochastic game, does not imply the existence of a perfect limiting average equilibrium.
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