Outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90137-NMaRDI QIDQ1802088zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alberto Dalmazzo

Publication date 30 September 1993

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90137-n

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingunique perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• On the Strategic Role of Outside Options in Bilateral Bargaining
• Bargaining in a non-stationary environment.
• Bargaining in a long-term relationship with endogenous termination
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Non-cooperative bargaining of N 3 players
• Outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game

Cited in

(2)

• Outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake
• Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points

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