An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2491037
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007zbMath1126.91008MaRDI QIDQ2491037
David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein
Publication date: 18 May 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1776
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information, A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition, An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
- Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
- An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value