An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.11.007MaRDI QIDQ2491037zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Publication date 18 May 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1776

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyfairnessnon-transferable utility games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
• An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3347963 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

Cited in

(10)

• Weighted values and the core in NTU games
• Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
• Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
• The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
• Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
• Cost sharing in production economies
• A coalitional extension of the ordinal Shapley-Shubik value
• A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule

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