An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007zbMath1126.91008OpenAlexW2148494242MaRDI QIDQ2491037

David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Publication date: 18 May 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1776

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessconsistencynon-transferable utility games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ Weighted values and the core in NTU games ⋮ The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information ⋮ Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach

Cites Work

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• Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
• Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
• An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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