Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A course in game theory.
- Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
- Bargaining without commitment
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
- Game theory
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- The importance of the agenda in bargaining
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cited in
(10)- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
- Subgame perfect equilibria in model with bargaining costs varying in time
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion
- Backward induction and unacceptable offers
- Payoffs in generalized sequential bargaining games
- Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models
- A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model
- Subbalanced games and bargaining sets
- Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games
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