Delegating infrastructure projects with open access

DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0198-2MaRDI QIDQ862428zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Keizo Mizuno, Tetsuya Shinkai

Publication date 24 January 2007

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp28.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

access chargecoalitiondelegationnetwork infrastructure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Public goods (91B18) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Co-investment deterrence
• Shared network investment
• From access to bypass: a real options approach
• Investment choice with managerial incentive schemes
• Franchise bidding, regulation and investment costs

Cites work

• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division

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