Revenue from matching platforms

DOI10.3982/TE3665MaRDI QIDQ5164514zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philip Marx, James Schummer

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3665

zbMATH Keywords

matchingplatformspricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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(12)

• Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers
• Armstrong meets Rochet-Tirole: on the equivalence of different pricing structures in two-sided markets
• Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform
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• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Information management and pricing in platform markets
• Technical note -- Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• Quality selection in two-sided markets: a constrained price discrimination approach
• Prediction algorithms in matching platforms
• The economics of platforms in a Walrasian framework
• Price discrimination and efficient matching

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