COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES
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Publication:2855501
DOI10.1142/S0219198913500047zbMath1277.91008MaRDI QIDQ2855501
Publication date: 25 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley ⋮ The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities ⋮ Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability ⋮ A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities
Cites Work
- The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
- The equilibria of a multiple objective game
- A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity in oligopoly games
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
- Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
- COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
- N‐person games in partition function form
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