COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198913500047zbMath1277.91008MaRDI QIDQ2855501

Paraskevas V. Lekeas

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

core; cooperative game; Cournot competition; externalities; \(j\)-belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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