Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.09.004zbMath1422.91471OpenAlexW2895530292MaRDI QIDQ2318003

Kohei Takeda, Toyoki Hosoe, Nobuo Matsubayashi, Takayuki Watanabe

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopoly marketmarkets with asymmetric substitutabilitystability of horizontal mergers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies

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