Coalitional beliefs in Cournot oligopoly TU games (Q2855501)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6220082
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| English | Coalitional beliefs in Cournot oligopoly TU games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6220082 |
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25 October 2013
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cooperative game
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Cournot competition
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core
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\(j\)-belief
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externalities
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Coalitional beliefs in Cournot oligopoly TU games (English)
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The paper looks for sets of beliefs that support core nonemptiness in Cournot oligopoly games with symmetrically differentiated goods considering both complementarity and substituality. A TU game is defined as a differentiated Cournot competition: fixing the number of coalitions, that outsiders form, to \(j\) then the TU game relies on the notion of \(j\)-belief. Applying the classical core concept in such TU games one constructs coalitional beliefs of the agents that support cooperation.
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0.8088470101356506
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0.8021934032440186
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0.7808634042739868
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0.7791926264762878
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0.776455819606781
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