The existence of TU -core in normal form games

DOI10.1007/S001820050096MaRDI QIDQ1293478zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jingang Zhao

Publication date 2 May 2001

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050096

zbMATH Keywords

coretransferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(27)

• The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
• On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities
• Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs
• On the \(\alpha\)-core of set payoffs games
• The core in an \(n\)-firm dynamic Cournot oligopoly
• The strategic cores \(\alpha , \beta , \gamma \) and \(\delta \)
• Hadamard well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core
• Transferable-utility \(\beta\)-core of discontinuous games
• A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities
• The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
• Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function
• The core of a strategic game
• Strongly strategic support of cooperative solutions for games over event trees
• Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
• The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities
• On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games
• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
• On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players
• The \(\alpha\)-core in a multi-objective game with set payoffs
• On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium
• On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
• NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
• Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees
• The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities
• On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game
• On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games
• The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the \(\alpha\)-core

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