The core in an n-firm dynamic Cournot oligopoly
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4149922 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- A local theory of cooperative games
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Coalitional beliefs in Cournot oligopoly TU games
- Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV
- Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
- Cooperative decision making in common pool situations
- Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Games and dynamic games
- Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume II: Applications
- N‐person games in partition function form
- On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities
- On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game
- On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
- Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
- Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences
- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
- The equilibria of a multiple objective game
- The existence of TU \(\alpha\)-core in normal form games
- The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
- Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley
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