The core in an n-firm dynamic Cournot oligopoly
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6575503
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.02.005zbMATH Open1543.91075MaRDI QIDQ6575503FDOQ6575503
Authors: Lei Wang, Jingang Zhao
Publication date: 20 July 2024
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
- A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
- Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core
- Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core
- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Games and dynamic games
- Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- N‐person games in partition function form
- The equilibria of a multiple objective game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
- The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
- On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities
- A local theory of cooperative games
- The existence of TU \(\alpha\)-core in normal form games
- Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley
- Cooperative decision making in common pool situations
- Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
- Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume II: Applications
- Coalitional beliefs in Cournot oligopoly TU games
- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
- Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
- Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences
- On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
- On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game
This page was built for publication: The core in an \(n\)-firm dynamic Cournot oligopoly
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6575503)